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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
HARRIS, District Judge. 
 
This appeal arises out of a factual setting of unusual 
corruption, involving a flooded portion of a warehouse 
resulting from a broken sprinkler head; a fraudulent 
insurance claim filed by a father and son; a cousin who 
took part in the scheme, but later testified against his 
relatives as a government witness, only to be caught on 
tape by the government encouraging an individual to falsely 
implicate someone in a different crime; and the use at trial 
of a statement by a deceased state court judge who had 
been removed from the bench and disbarred for unethical 
conduct. It requires us to apply our standards governing 
new trials under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 and 
a prosecutor's vouching for the credibility of witnesses, and 
to interpret the intersection of two rules of evidence. 
 
A jury convicted Isaac Saada and his son, Neil Saada 
(collectively "appellants" and sometimes identified by their 
first names), of one count of conspiracy to defraud an 
insurance company in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 371, two 
counts of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1341, and 
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one count of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C.S 1343. 
The District Court sentenced Isaac to concurrent prison 
terms of 36 months, and Neil to concurrent prison terms of 
30 months. Shortly after being sentenced, appellantsfiled 
a motion for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered 
evidence, which the District Court denied. Appellants 
challenge the District Court's denial of their motion for a 
new trial, a number of its evidentiary rulings made during 
the trial, and the propriety of certain statements made by 
the government during its rebuttal argument. We will 
affirm. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
A. Factual Background 
 
Appellants owned and operated a business named 
Scrimshaw Handicrafts ("Scrimshaw") in New Jersey that 
purchased, manufactured, and sold items made from ivory, 
jewels, gold, and other materials. Appellants faced 
significant financial difficulties. In August 1990, they were 
sued on a $6 million bank loan made to an entity named 
Kiddie Craft; each appellant had personally guaranteed the 
total amount of the loan, and each thus was liable for the 
amount of the subsequent settlement of the lawsuit-- $3.8 
million. During this period, Scrimshaw was operating at a 
net loss, and ultimately it filed for bankruptcy in June 
1991. 
 
The government's evidence at trial showed that, in 1990, 
appellants contacted Ezra Rishty, Isaac's cousin, for help in 
an insurance fraud scheme. Rishty was a public insurance 
adjuster in New York City who had conspired with various 
clients in over 200 fraudulent insurance schemes in the 
past. Rishty agreed to assist Isaac in filing a fraudulent 
insurance claim, and enlisted the help of Morris Beyda, a 
former employee who by then owned his own business. 
Rishty also enlisted the help of Sal Marchello, a general 
adjuster for the Chubb Insurance Group ("Chubb"), which 
was Scrimshaw's insurer. Marchello assured Rishty that 
Chubb would assign him to handle the future Scrimshaw 
claim. 
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The basis of the fraudulent insurance claim was a staged 
flooding in Scrimshaw's warehouse caused by a broken 
sprinkler head. Beyda testified that, on November 28, 1990, 
he went to the warehouse and, with the assistance of Neil, 
broke a sprinkler head located above a caged area 
containing Scrimshaw's most valuable merchandise. When 
Neil and Beyda broke the sprinkler head, Isaac was in his 
office with Tom Yaccarino, a vice-president of Scrimshaw 
and former New Jersey state court judge. Breaking the 
sprinkler head caused a flood of dirty water to fall on the 
boxes in the cage, which triggered an automatic alarm and 
prompted police and fire fighters to go to the Scrimshaw 
warehouse. Neil told them the agreed-upon cover story -- 
that he had accidentally broken the sprinkler head while 
moving a heavy box that was piled on top of other boxes in 
the storage area, near the ceiling. A few days later, Beyda 
returned to the warehouse and increased the damage by 
spraying water on boxes of merchandise that previously 
had not been damaged. 
 
Appellants submitted an insurance claim and proof of 
loss to Chubb for the merchandise damaged by the 
purported accident. The proof of loss contained an 
inventory of the damaged items, which included items that 
had in fact not been damaged. Appellants retained Rishty's 
company, United International Adjusters, to assist them 
with this claim. Chubb assigned Marchello to investigate 
the claim, who in turn hired Kurt Wagner -- an insurance 
salver -- to assess the extent of damage and to valuate the 
merchandise. Wagner took part in the fraudulent scheme 
by vouching for the accuracy of the proof of loss, without 
actually inspecting the inventory listed. 
 
Chubb hired an accounting firm to review the valuation 
in the proof of loss. Appellants were unable to provide 
invoices for certain merchandise valued at approximately 
$500,000 that was listed in their claim. Neil informed the 
accountants that they were having trouble locating these 
invoices because they were old and stored away in a trailer. 
Appellants thereafter submitted forged invoices indicating 
that Scrimshaw had purchased the merchandise in 
question from a jewelry wholesaler in New York. When the 
accountants became suspicious about these invoices 
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because they were in "pristine" condition, Marchello told 
them to accept the invoices and not to investigate any 
further. 
 
Chubb also sent an investigator to interview appellants 
regarding the water damage claim. In separate interviews, 
at which Rishty was present, appellants stated that their 
business was not facing financial difficulties. Isaac also 
stated that he had hired Rishty as a public adjuster 
because he had seen an advertisement of his company, but 
did not state that he was related to Rishty. 
 
Chubb ultimately paid appellants $865,000 on the 
fraudulent claim, $270,000 of which appellants paid to 
Rishty for his role in the scheme. Rishty paid Beyda, 
Marchello, and Wagner for their roles in the scheme out of 
his share of the money. 
 
B. Procedural Background 
 
In December 1992, federal agents executed search 
warrants for the business offices of Rishty and Beyda in 
New York. Shortly thereafter, Rishty and Beyda agreed to 
cooperate with the government.1 Between 1992 and 1997, 
Rishty spent approximately 3,000 hours, and Beyda spent 
over 1,000 hours, cooperating with the government in 
various insurance fraud investigations. In the course of this 
cooperation, Rishty admitted to having participated in over 
200 fraudulent insurance claims. Rishty and Beyda also 
advised the government of the fraudulent water damage 
claim submitted by Scrimshaw. Pursuant to their 
cooperation agreements, Rishty and Beyda pleaded guilty to 
various fraud-related offenses in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of New York. Rishty also 
pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit mail fraud in the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey 
for his role in the Scrimshaw claim. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Rishty entered into one cooperation agreement with the United States 
Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, and another with the 
United States Attorneys for the District of New Jersey and the District of 
Connecticut. Beyda entered into a cooperation agreement only with the 
United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York. 
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In an indictment filed in the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey, appellants were charged with 
one count of conspiracy to defraud an insurance company, 
three counts of mail fraud, and one count of wire fraud.2 
Before trial, the District Court dismissed one of the mail 
fraud counts pursuant to a government motion. At trial, 
both Rishty and Beyda testified for the government, 
pursuant to their cooperation agreements, as to appellants' 
involvement in the fraudulent water damage claim. 
Appellants' defense was that Rishty and Beyda were falsely 
implicating them in order to receive the benefit of motions 
for reduced sentences on the charges to which they had 
pled guilty. The jury convicted appellants on the four 
remaining counts in the indictment. After being sentenced, 
appellants moved unsuccessfully for a new trial on the 
basis of newly discovered evidence. We now turn to the 
contentions raised in this appeal. 
 
II. MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL 
 
Appellants first challenge the District Court's denial of 
their motion for a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 33. We review that decision for an abuse of 
discretion. See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Lima, 
774 F.2d 1245, 1250 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. 
Adams, 759 F.2d 1099, 1108 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 
The new evidence forming the basis of appellants' motion 
consists of a crime committed by Rishty after appellants 
had been convicted. In July 1997, Rishty advised an 
individual named Robert Falack to give false testimony 
against an innocent third party, under the guise of 
cooperating with the government, in order to receive a 
reduced sentence on a pending criminal charge.3 Rishty's 
urging was captured on audio tape, as Falack wore a wire 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The indictment also charged Isaac separately in five other counts, but 
the District Court granted a motion to sever those counts. 
 
3. Because Rishty's conduct violated the terms of his cooperation 
agreement with the government, the United States Attorney for the 
Eastern District of New York did not file a motion under S 5K1.1 of the 
Sentencing Guidelines for a reduced sentence on the charges to which 
he had pled guilty. 
 
                                6 
  
during the conversation. The tape reveals that Rishty also 
told Falack that he would "back up" his story"100 
percent," that Rishty admitted to withholding information 
from the government during his cooperation, and that the 
government sometimes gave him information about a 
particular crime when asking him whether it had occurred. 
Appellants claim that this newly discovered evidence 
warrants a new trial because it undermines Rishty's 
testimony and bolsters their trial defense by providing 
powerful evidence of Rishty's willingness falsely to implicate 
innocent people in order to receive leniency at sentencing. 
 
At the outset, we note that the newly discovered evidence 
may also be characterized as "newly created" evidence 
because Rishty did not encourage Falack to give false 
testimony until after appellants had been convicted. We 
share the skepticism expressed by the trial court over the 
viability of a defendant's application for a new trial that 
relies solely on evidence of a government witness' bad acts 
committed after the defendant has been convicted. 
However, we need not resolve whether this type of evidence 
may ever warrant a new trial because the relevant evidence 
in this case does not meet our well-established standard for 
a new trial. Our case law makes clear that five 
requirements must be met before a trial court may grant a 
new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence: 
 
       (a) the evidence must be in fact newly discovered, i.e. 
       discovered since trial; (b) facts must be alleged from 
       which the court may infer diligence on the part of the 
       movant; (c) the evidence relied on must not be merely 
       cumulative or impeaching; (d) it must be material to 
       the issues involved; and (e) it must be such, and of 
       such nature, as that, on a new trial, the newly 
       discovered evidence would probably produce an 
       acquittal. 
 
Lima, 774 F.2d at 1250 (quoting United States v. Ianelli, 
528 F.2d 1290, 1292 (3d Cir. 1976)). The movant has a 
"heavy burden" in meeting these requirements. United 
States v. Ashfield, 735 F.2d 101, 112 (3d Cir. 1984). We 
agree with the District Court that appellants did not meet 
their burden. 
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First, the new evidence in this case fails the requirement 
that it not be merely cumulative or impeaching. The 
evidence is only impeaching because there is no 
exculpatory connection between Rishty's act of counseling 
Falack to falsely implicate an innocent person in another 
case and appellants' acts of causing a flooding of their 
storage area and filing a fraudulent insurance claim. 
Nothing in Rishty's conversation with Falack supports an 
inference that appellants were innocent of the charges for 
which they were convicted.4 The evidence is only cumulative 
because the jury heard an overwhelming amount of 
evidence impeaching Rishty's credibility. Among other 
things, that evidence probed the extent of Rishty's 
participation in over 200 fraudulent insurance schemes, his 
criminal record, and his cooperation agreement with the 
government, under which he was eligible to receive the 
benefit of a S 5K1.1 motion for a reduced sentence.5 This 
evidence undoubtedly caused the jury to question the 
veracity of Rishty's testimony implicating appellants in the 
fraudulent insurance scheme. Given the abundance of 
impeachment evidence presented at trial detailing Rishty's 
propensity for deceitful acts and his incentive for testifying 
as a government witness, we conclude that the District 
Court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the new 
evidence was merely cumulative. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In his conversation with Falack, Rishty referred to Isaac as a "moron" 
who had "caused his own problem" by backing out of a purportedly 
favorable plea offer with prosecutors. This comment is not probative of 
innocence because it evidences Rishty's belief that appellants were 
guilty. 
 
5. For example, the jury heard evidence that: (1) the total value of the 
fraudulent claims in which Rishty had participated was approximately 
$38 million; (2) approximately 20 of Rishty's employees had participated 
in his fraudulent insurance schemes; (3) Rishty had routinely bribed 
insurance adjusters and others in the insurance industry in connection 
with these schemes; (4) Rishty had taken money from his clients by 
telling them that he needed it for bribes, but had then kept it for 
himself; 
(5) Rishty had received approximately $5 million for his work on 
fraudulent claims over 6 years; (6) Rishty had pled guilty to mail fraud 
and tax evasion in federal court in New York, and had pled guilty to 
insurance fraud in federal court in New Jersey; (7) Rishty had another 
prior conviction for larceny; and (8) Rishty was testifying as a 
cooperator 
with the hope of receiving a reduced sentence. 
 
                                8 
  
Nor did the District Court err in concluding that the new 
evidence failed another requirement for a new trial-- that 
it would probably produce an acquittal. The District Court 
reasoned that there was sufficient evidence, independent of 
Rishty's testimony, to support the jury's findings of guilt.6 
In doing so, it emphasized that portions of Beyda's 
testimony indicating his presence at the Scrimshaw 
warehouse on the night of the staged flooding had been 
corroborated by independent evidence. This corroborating 
evidence established Beyda's familiarity with the layout of 
the warehouse, the individuals present on the night of the 
flooding, and the details of the flooding as they unfolded, 
and accordingly laid the foundation for his elaborate 
testimony implicating appellants in the fraudulent scheme. 
Appellants contend, however, that the new evidence would 
lead a jury to discredit Beyda's testimony because his 
testimony was inextricably linked to Rishty's testimony. 
Appellants seek to account (as they must) for the 
independent corroboration of Beyda's testimony by arguing 
that Beyda could have learned about the warehouse and 
flooding from Rishty, who would have acquired those 
details through his purportedly lawful role as Scrimshaw's 
public claims adjuster.7 
 
Appellants' argument is unpersuasive. First, the jury did 
not credit it at trial, even though it heard evidence that 
Rishty and Beyda had been debriefed together by the 
government, and had continued to communicate with each 
other while they were cooperating. The new evidence would 
not prompt a jury to accept appellants' theory because 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Appellants argue that the District Court's conclusion was based on an 
incorrect legal standard insofar as it assessed whether there was 
sufficient independent evidence to support a conviction, instead of 
whether the new evidence was likely to create a"reasonable doubt." 
Appellants' argument is unavailing; we previously have employed an 
approach focusing on the sufficiency of evidence when reviewing the 
denial of a motion for a new trial. See Adams , 759 F.2d at 1108 (stating 
that "other [non-tainted] evidence in the case was more than sufficient 
to sustain a finding of guilt"). 
 
7. At trial, the defense denied Rishty's and Beyda's presence at the 
warehouse on the night of the flooding, but did not deny that Rishty 
subsequently had assisted appellants in filing their insurance claim. 
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Rishty's incriminating conversation with Falack does not 
suggest that Beyda was falsely implicating people in crimes. 
In any event, appellants' argument does not account for 
certain aspects of Beyda's independently corroborated 
testimony. For example, Beyda correctly testified that a 
police officer responding to the alarm triggered by the 
broken sprinkler head had radioed his headquarters, upon 
arriving at the warehouse, to inform it that there was no 
fire; there is no indication that Rishty knew of this 
statement because Rishty was not present during the 
flooding and would not necessarily have learned of it 
through his role as a public adjuster. Thus, we conclude 
that the new evidence did not undermine the strength of 
Beyda's testimony implicating appellants in the fraudulent 
insurance scheme. The government also presented other 
evidence probative of appellants' guilt, such as their 
financial motive to commit insurance fraud, their false 
statements to the Chubb investigator, their forging of 
invoices for merchandise they claimed had been damaged 
during the staged flooding, and the positioning and design 
of the sprinkler head, which undermined the strength of 
their cover story about the cause of the broken sprinkler 
head. Given this independent evidence of appellants' guilt, 
and the strength of Beyda's untainted testimony, the 
District Court's conclusion that the new evidence would not 
probably produce an acquittal was hardly erroneous. 
 
Because the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
concluding that the new evidence failed not only one but 
two of the necessary requirements for a new trial, we will 
affirm its decision denying appellants' Rule 33 motion. 
 
III. EVIDENTIARY RULINGS 
 
Appellants challenge the admission of two pieces of 
evidence at trial: evidence of prior misconduct by Tom 
Yaccarino, a former judge and vice-president of Scrimshaw 
at the time of the flooding, and evidence of Isaac's 
participation in another fraudulent insurance scheme with 
Rishty. We find error in the admission of thefirst piece of 
evidence, but conclude that it was harmless. We also 
conclude that there was no error with respect to the second 
piece of evidence. 
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A. Evidence of Yaccarino's Prior Misconduct 
 
Appellants contend that the District Court improperly 
admitted evidence of specific instances of misconduct by 
Yaccarino to impeach his credibility. The impetus for the 
admission of this evidence was the prior admission of a 
statement made by Yaccarino at the time of the water 
damage. Linda Chewning, a Scrimshaw employee, testified 
that she was working in the warehouse on the night in 
question. During cross-examination by defense counsel, 
she testified that Yaccarino had run into the office kitchen 
screaming words to the effect of "oh my God, Neil did 
something stupid, [threw] something, now he has got a 
mess . . . . I can't believe it. He is so stupid. He threw it. 
He is stupid, he is dumb." Yaccarino was deceased at the 
time of trial. The District Court admitted his statement as 
hearsay under the excited utterance exception in Fed. R. 
Evid. 803(2).8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Rule 801(c) defines hearsay as "a statement, other than one made by 
the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in 
evidence 
to prove the truth of the matter asserted." As this makes clear, not every 
extrajudicial statement constitutes hearsay. Rather,"[i]f the significance 
of an offered statement lies solely in the fact that it was made, no issue 
is raised as to the truth of the matter asserted, and the statement is not 
hearsay." Fed. R. Evid. 801(c) advisory committee's note. Typically 
known as "verbal acts" (or perhaps more logically as "verbal utterances"), 
such statements thus give rise to legal consequences independent of 
their assertive quality. See, e.g., Mueller v. Abdnor, 972 F.2d 931, 937 
(8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Cardascia, 951 F.2d 474, 486-87 (2d 
Cir. 1991); Weinstein's Evidence P 801.03[2] (1999). 
 
Appellants sought to have Yaccarino's statement admitted to prove the 
truth of the assertion that Neil had accidentally broken the sprinkler 
head, while the government maintained that his statement was for 
"show" and merely part of the larger cover story. The excited utterance 
exception, pursuant to which the District Court admitted Yaccarino's 
statement, allows admission of a hearsay "statement relating to a 
startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the 
stress of excitement caused by the event or condition." Fed. R. Evid. 
803(2). We are doubtful, however, that appellants were entitled to 
admission of Yaccarino's statement under this exception because case 
law imposes a requirement that the declarant "personally perceived the 
event or condition about which the statement is made." United States v. 
Mitchell, 145 F.3d 572, 576 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Miller v. Keating, 754 
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Yaccarino's statement was important to appellants' 
defense because it purportedly provided contemporaneous 
evidence supporting their claim that Neil accidentally had 
broken the sprinkler head. Accordingly, the government 
sought to attack the statement by impeaching Yaccarino's 
credibility. The government asked the District Court to take 
judicial notice of two New Jersey Supreme Court decisions 
ordering Yaccarino's removal from the bench and 
disbarment for unethical conduct, as well as the factual 
details supporting those decisions, which reflected his 
unethical conduct.9 Appellants objected to that evidence on 
the grounds that the credibility of a hearsay declarant may 
not be impeached with extrinsic evidence of bad acts, and 
that the danger of unfair prejudice from this evidence 
substantially outweighed its probative value. Overruling 
these objections, the District Court took judicial notice of 
the two New Jersey Supreme Court decisions and their 
factual underpinnings. Appellants renew their objections to 
this evidence, and raise new challenges on the grounds that 
judicial notice of the facts in the two court opinions was not 
proper, and that the District Court conveyed an 
unfavorable assessment of Yaccarino's credibility to the jury 
in taking such judicial notice. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
F.2d 507, 511 (3d Cir. 1985)). The record is bereft of any suggestion that 
Yaccarino perceived Neil's purported act of throwing a box and 
accidentally breaking the sprinkler head; to the contrary, it shows that 
Yaccarino was in Isaac's office when the sprinkler head was broken, and 
that Neil subsequently ran into the office to inform them of the alleged 
accident. Nevertheless, despite our skepticism over whether the personal 
perception requirement was in fact met, for review purposes we defer to 
the District Court's ruling admitting Yaccarino's statement for the truth 
of the matter asserted under the excited utterance exception. 
 
9. The extent of Yaccarino's unethical conduct was substantial. Among 
other things, Yaccarino had attempted to buy real estate that was the 
subject of litigation before him and, after learning that the property 
owner had recorded incriminating statements he had made, Yaccarino 
attempted to persuade the property owner to submit a false affidavit or 
give false testimony in court which would exonerate him. Yaccarino also 
failed to disclose his interest in two liquor licenses that he held in 
violation of New Jersey law. See generally In the Matter of Yaccarino, 101 
N.J. 342, 502 A.2d 3 (1985). 
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Appellants first argue that the judicially noticed evidence 
was admitted improperly because, although Federal Rule of 
Evidence 806 provides for the impeachment of a hearsay 
declarant, it limits that impeachment to "any evidence 
which would be admissible for [impeachment purposes] 
. . . if declarant had testified as a witness." Here, the 
judicially noticed evidence involved specific instances of 
Yaccarino's misconduct and, as the government 
acknowledged at trial, constituted extrinsic evidence. 
Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b) states: 
 
       Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the 
       purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' 
       credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided 
       in rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. 
       They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if 
       probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be 
       inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) 
       concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or 
       untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for 
       truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to 
       which character the witness being cross-examined has 
       testified. 
 
Appellants argue that if Yaccarino had testified, Rule 608(b) 
would have prevented the government from introducing 
extrinsic evidence of his unethical conduct, and would have 
limited the government to questioning him about that 
conduct on cross-examination. Thus, appellants argue, 
judicial notice of the evidence constituted improper 
impeachment of a hearsay declarant. The government 
correctly avers that it would have been allowed to inquire 
into Yaccarino's misconduct on cross-examination if he had 
testified at trial because Rule 806 allows a party against 
whom a hearsay statement is admitted to call the declarant 
as a witness and "to examine the declarant on the 
statement as if under cross-examination." Because 
Yaccarino's death foreclosed eliciting the facts of his 
misconduct in this manner, the government argues that it 
was entitled to introduce extrinsic evidence of his 
misconduct. In effect, the government argues that, read in 
concert, Rules 806 and 608(b) permit the introduction of 
extrinsic evidence of misconduct when a hearsay declarant 
is unavailable to testify. 
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Our standard of review is tied to the resolution of the 
very issue about which the parties disagree -- the interplay 
of Rules 806 and 608(b). We afford a district court's 
evidentiary ruling plenary review insofar as it was based on 
an interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, but 
review a ruling to admit or exclude evidence, if based on a 
permissible interpretation of those rules, for an abuse of 
discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 91 F.3d 396, 
402 (3d Cir. 1996); United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641, 
656 (3d Cir. 1993). In this case, the District Court implicitly 
interpreted Rule 806 to modify Rule 608(b)'s ban on the 
introduction of extrinsic evidence in the context of a 
hearsay declarant.10 Accordingly, we must determine 
whether that interpretation is permissible to ascertain 
whether the District Court's admission of the evidence 
should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 
 
At the outset, we note that the issue of whether Rule 806 
modifies Rule 608(b)'s ban on extrinsic evidence is a matter 
of first impression in this circuit, and a matter which the 
majority of our sister courts likewise has not yet addressed. 
Indeed, there are only two circuit court opinions construing 
the effect of Rule 806's intersection with Rule 608(b). Those 
cases are themselves in conflict. In United States v. 
Friedman, 854 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1988), the Second Circuit 
held that the trial court properly excluded impeachment 
evidence that a hearsay declarant had lied to the police 
because that evidence was not probative of the truthfulness 
of the hearsay statement there at issue. Id. at 569-70. In 
doing so, however, the court suggested that extrinsic 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. In ruling that the evidence of Yaccarino's misconduct was admissible, 
the District Judge stated, in part: 
 
       The situation involving former Judge Yaccarino clearly comes within 
       Rule 806 in that his statement has been admitted in evidence, and 
       the question is an attack upon his credibility. Rule 806 says it 
may 
       be attacked by any evidence which would be admissible if former 
       Judge Yaccarino had testified. If former Judge Yaccarino had 
       testified, I would allow the government to cross-examine him with 
       respect to the removal from office, and disbarment under the second 
       sentence of Rule 608(b). Certainly his disbarment and removal from 
       office would relate to his character for truthfulness or 
       untruthfulness. 
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evidence of such misconduct would have been admissible 
had the misconduct been probative of truthfulness:"[Rule 
608(b)] limits such evidence of `specific instances' to cross- 
examination. Rule 806 applies, of course, when the 
declarant has not testified and there has by definition been 
no cross-examination, and resort to extrinsic evidence may 
be the only means of presenting such evidence to the jury." 
Id. at 570 n.8. The Second Circuit's position in Friedman 
conflicts with the District of Columbia Circuit's more recent 
statement in United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903 (D.C. Cir. 
1997). In that case, the district court had allowed defense 
counsel to cross-examine a police officer about a hearsay 
declarant's drug use, drug dealing, and prior convictions, 
but had not allowed defense counsel to impeach the 
declarant's credibility by asking the officer whether the 
declarant had ever made false statements on an 
employment form or disobeyed a court order. Id.  at 920. 
The declarant was unavailable because he had been 
murdered. Id. at 911. The court of appeals concluded that 
defense counsel should have been allowed to cross-examine 
the officer about the declarant's making false statements 
and disobeying a court order.11 In doing so, the court 
observed that defense counsel "could not have made 
reference to any extrinsic proof of those acts" during cross- 
examination. Id. at 920. Thus, in contrast to the Second 
Circuit in Friedman, the D.C. Circuit in White took the 
position that the ban on extrinsic evidence of misconduct 
applies in the context of hearsay declarants, even when 
those declarants are unavailable to testify. 
 
We agree with the approach taken by the court in White, 
and conclude that Rule 806 does not modify Rule 608(b)'s 
ban on extrinsic evidence of prior bad acts in the context of 
hearsay declarants, even when those declarants are 
unavailable to testify. We perceive our holding to be 
dictated by the plain -- albeit imperfectly meshed-- 
language of Rules 806 and 608(b). As discussed, Rule 806 
allows impeachment of a hearsay declarant only to the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. The court in White went on to conclude that the district court had 
not abused its discretion in disallowing the testimony because the 
testimony would have been of marginal utility given the declarant's 
already damaged credibility. Id. at 920. 
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extent that impeachment would be permissible had the 
declarant testified as a witness, which, in the case of 
specific instances of misconduct, is limited to cross- 
examination under Rule 608(b). The asserted basis for 
declining to adhere to the clear thrust of these rules is that 
the only avenue for using information of prior bad acts to 
impeach the credibility of a witness -- cross-examination -- 
is closed if the hearsay declarant cannot be called to testify. 
We are unpersuaded by this rationale. First, the 
unavailability of the declarant will not always foreclose 
using prior misconduct as an impeachment tool because 
the witness testifying to the hearsay statement may be 
questioned about the declarant's misconduct -- without 
reference to extrinsic evidence thereof -- on cross- 
examination concerning knowledge of the declarant's 
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.12 And, even if 
a hearsay declarant's credibility may not be impeached with 
evidence of prior misconduct, other avenues for impeaching 
the hearsay statement remain open. For example, the 
credibility of the hearsay declarant -- and indeed that of 
the witness testifying to the hearsay statement-- may be 
impeached with opinion and reputation evidence of 
character under Rule 608(a), evidence of criminal 
convictions under Rule 609, and evidence of prior 
inconsistent statements under Rule 613. The unavailability 
of one form of impeachment, under a specific set of 
circumstances, does not justify overriding the plain 
language of the Rules of Evidence. Cf. United States v. 
Finley, 934 F.2d 837, 839 (7th Cir. 1991) ("Rule 806 
extends the privilege of impeaching the declarant of a 
hearsay statement but does not obliterate the rules of 
evidence that govern how impeachment is to proceed"). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. We recognize the dilemma presented if the witness has no knowledge 
of the hearsay declarant's misconduct. One solution:firm adherence to 
the hearsay rules (Rules 801-807) in determining whether a proffered 
statement truly is admissible in the first instance. It is, of course, not 
the role of the trial judge to make a credibility determination in a 
criminal jury trial. Nonetheless, when an out-of-court declaration is 
offered for the truth of the matter asserted, it becomes "hearsay," 
subject 
to the exclusions in Rule 801(d), and is presumptively inadmissible, 
subject only to carefully defined exceptions. See Fed. R. Evid. 802-804, 
807. 
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We also read the language of Rule 806 implicitly to reject 
the asserted rationale for lifting the ban on extrinsic 
evidence. Rule 806 makes no allowance for the 
unavailability of a hearsay declarant in the context of 
impeachment by specific instances of misconduct, but 
makes such an allowance in the context of impeachment by 
prior inconsistent statements. Rule 613 requires that a 
witness be given the opportunity to admit or deny a prior 
inconsistent statement before extrinsic evidence of that 
statement may be introduced. If a hearsay declarant does 
not testify, however, this requirement will not usually be 
met. Rule 806 cures any problem over the admissibility of 
a non-testifying declarant's prior inconsistent statement by 
providing that evidence of the statement "is not subject to 
any requirement that the declarant may have been afforded 
an opportunity to deny or explain." See generally Fed. R. 
Evid. 806 advisory committee's notes. The fact that Rule 
806 does not provide a comparable allowance for the 
unavailability of a hearsay declarant in the context of Rule 
608(b)'s ban on extrinsic evidence indicates that the latter's 
ban on extrinsic evidence applies with equal force in the 
context of hearsay declarants. 
 
In reaching this conclusion, we are mindful of its 
consequences. Upholding the ban on extrinsic evidence in 
the case of a hearsay declarant may require the party 
against whom the hearsay statement was admitted to call 
the declarant to testify, even though it was the party's 
adversary who adduced the statement requiring 
impeachment in the first place. And, as here, where the 
declarant is unavailable to testify, the ban prevents using 
evidence of prior misconduct as a form of impeachment, 
unless the witness testifying to the hearsay has knowledge 
of the declarant's misconduct. See generally 4 Mueller & 
Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence S 511 at 894 n.7 (2d ed. 
1994); Margaret Meriwether Cordray, Evidence Rule 806 
and the Problem of Impeaching the Nontestifying Declarant, 
56 Ohio St. L.J. 495, 525-530 (1995). Nevertheless, these 
possible drawbacks may not override the language of Rules 
806 and 608(b), and do not outweigh the reason for Rule 
608(b)'s ban on extrinsic evidence in the first place, which 
is "to avoid minitrials on wholly collateral matters which 
tend to distract and confuse the jury . . . and to prevent 
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unfair surprise arising from false allegations of improper 
conduct." Carter v. Hewitt, 617 F.2d 961, 971 (3d Cir. 
1980) (internal quotations and citation omitted); accord 
United States v. Martz, 964 F.2d 787, 789 (8th Cir. 1992); 
Foster v. United States, 282 F.2d 222, 223 (10th Cir. 1960). 
 
From our conclusion that the ban on extrinsic evidence 
of misconduct applies in the context of hearsay declarants, 
it follows that the District Court's ruling admitting evidence 
of Yaccarino's misconduct was based on an incorrect 
interpretation of Rules 806 and 608(b). We conclude, 
therefore, that the District Court erred in admitting such 
evidence. Nevertheless, we find the error to be harmless. An 
error is harmless if "it is highly probable that the error did 
not contribute to the judgment." United States v. Gibbs, 190 
F.3d 188, 213 n.16 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. 
Mastrangelo, 172 F.3d 288, 297 (3d Cir. 1999)). That 
standard is met "when the court possesses a `sure 
conviction' that the error did not prejudice the defendant." 
Id. The District Court's admission of extrinsic evidence of 
Yaccarino's misconduct did not prejudice appellants 
because, at the request of appellants' trial counsel, it also 
took judicial notice of Yaccarino's obituary to rehabilitate 
his credibility. The obituary cast Yaccarino in a very 
favorable light, as it contained salutary comments from two 
other judges, stated that he had done a lot of charitable 
work in the years preceding his death, and portrayed him 
as someone who believed steadfastly in the justice system, 
but who felt that the system had "let him down." In this 
last respect, the obituary provided an explanation for 
Yaccarino's conduct underlying his removal from the bench 
and his disbarment by describing his belief that his 
conduct resulted from a temporary mental disability he had 
suffered after undergoing open heart surgery in 1979. We 
are confident that the strength of these favorable comments 
counteracted the effects of the evidence impeaching 
Yaccarino's credibility.13 We conclude that the admission of 
Yaccarino's obituary, coupled with the District Court's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Isaac's trial counsel acknowledged this point when he stated to the 
court: "I have no problem admitting the good with the bad. If they want 
to slam his character, all I want is an attempt to support his character." 
Although this comment referred more immediately to the mix of favorable 
and unfavorable comments about Yaccarino in the obituary, it evidenced 
counsel's belief in the rehabilitative effect of the favorable comments. 
(It 
also should be noted that the obituary itself included multiple examples 
of blatant inadmissible hearsay, but we shall not dwell on that facet of 
the puzzle.) 
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instruction to the jury that it could not use evidence of 
Yaccarino's misconduct to find appellants guilty by 
association, removed any prejudice to appellants from the 
court's taking judicial notice of the two New Jersey state 
court opinions.14 The District Court's error in admitting the 
extrinsic impeachment evidence was, therefore, harmless. 
 
Our conclusion as to harmless error renders it 
unnecessary to address appellants' other two contentions 
challenging the admission of the impeachment evidence -- 
that the requirements for taking judicial notice were not 
satisfied and that the evidence was unduly prejudicial. 
Thus, all that remains of appellants' challenge to the 
evidence of Yaccarino's prior misconduct is their objection 
to the manner in which it was admitted. 
 
Appellants contend that the District Court conveyed an 
unfavorable impression of Yaccarino's credibility when 
taking judicial notice of the facts of his misconduct. 
Specifically, they argue that the trial judge communicated 
a "personal concern" to the jury that, because Yaccarino 
was unavailable to be cross-examined, he had to advise it 
of certain negative facts bearing on Yaccarino's character, 
leaving the jury with "the clear message that the judge 
could not allow them to evaluate Yaccarino's statements 
without his warning . . . ." We review this claim for plain 
error because appellants did not make such an objection at 
trial. See Failla v. City of Passaic, 146 F.3d 149, 159 (3d 
Cir. 1998); United States v. Gambino, 926 F.2d 1355, 1363 
n.6 (3d Cir. 1991). Accordingly, we consider whether there 
was "error" that was "plain" and that affected "substantial 
rights." United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). 
We find no such error here because the fair and neutral 
approach of the District Court is evident from the overall 
record. In advising the jury of certain facts regarding 
Yaccarino's misconduct, the trial judge explained that he 
was doing so because Yaccarino would have been subject to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Our skepticism as to the admissibility of Yaccarino's hearsay 
statement in the first instance, see supra n. 8, further assures us that 
appellants suffered no cognizable prejudice from the admission of 
extrinsic evidence impeaching his character for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness. 
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cross-examination if he had been alive, and instructed the 
jury that it was not required to consider those facts or 
accept them as conclusive. Appellants' claim that the effect 
of the judge's comments was to communicate a personal 
concern to the jury as to Yaccarino's credibility is meritless. 
 
B. Evidence of Isaac Saada's Participation in Another 
Fraudulent Insurance Scheme 
 
Appellants also challenge the District Court's decision 
admitting Rishty's testimony that Isaac had conspired with 
him to commit another insurance fraud -- the "Diadem 
claim" -- shortly after the warehouse flooding. We review 
the District Court's ruling for an abuse of discretion and 
will reverse only if it was "clearly contrary to reason and not 
justified by the evidence." United States v. Balter, 91 F.3d 
427, 437 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. 
Bethancourt, 65 F.3d 1074, 1079 (3d Cir. 1995)). That 
standard is not met here. 
 
Appellants first argue that the government and the trial 
judge did not properly articulate a basis for admission of 
Rishty's testimony under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), which bars 
evidence of crimes and other bad acts to establish an 
individual's propensity for such acts "to show action in 
conformity therewith," because the government only read 
the "laundry list" of permissible, non-propensity bases 
under Rule 404(b), which the District Court accepted 
without analysis. We disagree. At trial, the government did 
not merely read the list of non-propensity bases under Rule 
404(b), but rather explained that the evidence of Isaac's 
involvement in another fraud was admissible because it 
showed his intent to defraud, knowledge of the fraudulent 
nature of the water damage claim, and financial motive to 
commit insurance fraud, as well as the unlawful nature of 
his relationship with Rishty -- which rebutted the defense's 
position that Rishty had served as Scrimshaw's public 
adjuster in a lawful capacity -- and the absence of any 
accident. Following that explanation, the District Court 
indicated that it was admitting the evidence on the bases 
recited by the government. We conclude that the court 
properly admitted this evidence under Rule 404(b) and, by 
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referencing the government's position, reflected an adequate 
basis for its decision.15 
 
Appellants also raise a Rule 403 challenge to the 
admission of Rishty's testimony on the grounds that it 
created a danger that the jury would convict Isaac for being 
a repeat offender who had escaped punishment on another 
crime, and that this prejudice would spill over onto Neil. As 
relevant here, Rule 403 states that "evidence may be 
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice . . ." Evidence of Isaac's 
participation in the Diadem claim was highly probative 
because it rebutted the defense's contention that Rishty's 
involvement in the Scrimshaw claim was attributed to his 
purportedly lawful role as a public adjuster by establishing 
the unlawful nature of his relationship with Isaac. By 
contrast, the danger of unfair prejudice from the evidence 
was slight because Rishty already was implicating Isaac in 
the fraudulent Scrimshaw claim, and there was no evidence 
of the Diadem claim apart from his testimony; if the jury 
had been inclined to reject Rishty's testimony as to the 
Scrimshaw claim, Rishty's testimony as to the Diadem 
claim certainly would not have dissuaded it from doing so 
under a belief that Isaac was a repeat offender who should 
not escape punishment. The District Court's instruction to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. Appellants' citation to United States v. Murray, 103 F.3d 310 (3d. 
Cir. 
1997), is unavailing. In that case, we stated that trial judges should 
exercise care in admitting evidence under Rule 404(b) by insisting that 
the party offering such evidence articulate the basis for its 
admissibility, 
and by explaining the ruling admitting the evidence. Id. at 316; see also 
United States v. Himmelwright, 42 F.3d 777, 781 (3d Cir. 1994). Here, 
the government's articulation, and the court's acceptance, of the non- 
propensity bases for admitting evidence of Isaac's participation in 
another fraudulent claim satisfy our admonition in Murray. 
 
Consistent with the language of Rule 404(b), virtually all such issues 
are raised pretrial, and the evidentiary subtleties are discussed other 
than before the jury. However, often the full context of Rule 404(b) 
evidence may not be evaluated until all evidence has been presented, 
following which the jury may be carefully instructed as to the limited 
way in which the evidence may be considered. See Huddleston v. United 
States, 485 U.S. 681, 691 (1988); United States v. Jemal, 26 F.3d 1267, 
1272 n.2 (3d Cir. 1994). 
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the jury limiting the admission of the evidence to Isaac, and 
only for the limited purposes set forth by the judge, further 
minimized the danger of unfair prejudice. Thus, the District 
Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the 
danger of unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh 
the highly probative value of the evidence. 
 
IV. VOUCHING 
 
Appellants contend that the prosecutor improperly 
vouched for the credibility of Rishty and Beyda during 
rebuttal argument. Appellants' failure to object to what was 
said mandates a plain error analysis. See United States v. 
Walker, 155 F.3d 180, 187-88 (3d Cir. 1998); Bethancourt, 
65 F.3d at 1079. Accordingly, we may reverse only if we 
"find error in the prosecutor's comments so serious as to 
undermine the fundamental fairness of the trial and 
contribute to a miscarriage of justice." Walker, 155 F.3d at 
188 (internal quotations omitted). That standard is not met 
here; the prosecutor's arguments were entirely proper. 
 
As we stated recently in Walker, "[v]ouching constitutes 
an assurance by the prosecuting attorney of the credibility 
of a Government witness through personal knowledge or by 
other information outside of the testimony before the jury." 
Id. at 184. A prosecutor's vouching for the credibility of 
government witnesses poses two dangers: 
 
       . . . such comments can convey the impression that 
       evidence not presented to the jury, but known to the 
       prosecutor, supports the charges against the defendant 
       and can thus jeopardize the defendant's right to be 
       tried solely on the basis of the evidence presented to 
       the jury; and the prosecutor's opinion carries with it 
       the imprimatur of the Government and may induce the 
       jury to trust the Government's judgment rather than 
       its own view of the evidence. 
 
United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1985); accord 
United States v. Molina-Guevara, 96 F.3d 698, 704 (3d Cir. 
1998). Two criteria must be met in order to find vouching: 
(1) the prosecutor must assure the jury that the testimony 
of a government witness is credible, and (2) this assurance 
must be based on either the prosecutor's personal 
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knowledge or other information not contained in the record. 
See Walker, 155 F.3d at 187. 
 
The prosecutor did not engage in vouching because he 
grounded his comments on the evidence presented at trial. 
Appellants complain that during closing argument, the 
prosecutor improperly argued that Rishty and Beyda were 
not lying because (1) the S 5K1.1 motion depended on the 
government's recommendation; (2) they knew the S 5K1.1 
motion required truthful testimony; (3) they would go to 
prison and possibly be prosecuted for perjury if they did 
not testify truthfully; and (4) they had plenty of other 
crimes on which to cooperate, and thus had no need to 
falsely implicate appellants. Appellants concede that the 
evidence had established the following: under the terms of 
their cooperation agreements, Rishty and Beyda were 
required to testify truthfully; the government would not be 
required to recommend a reduced sentence if they did not 
present truthful information; and Rishty had spent some 
3,000 hours, and Beyda had spent at least 1,000 hours, 
cooperating with the government.16 Because the 
prosecutor's comments as to why Rishty and Beyda had an 
incentive to tell the truth were based on this evidence, they 
constituted proper argument and not improper vouching.17 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. Appellants also argue that the District Court erred in admitting this 
evidence because it improperly bolstered the credibility of Rishty and 
Beyda. We have approved the admissibility of a plea agreement's 
provision requiring truthful testimony by a cooperating witness on other 
occasions, see, e.g., United States v. Ramos, 27 F.3d 65, 67 n.4 (3d Cir. 
1994), and have stated that such evidence constitutes permissible 
rehabilitation where, as here, it is presented in response to, or in 
reasonable anticipation of, defense counsel's impeachment of the 
witness' credibility, see United States v. Oxman , 740 F.2d 1298, 1302-03 
(3d Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, sub nom. United States v. 
Pflaumer, 473 U.S. 922 (1985). Appellants' bolstering argument lacks 
merit. 
 
17. The cases cited by appellants, see United States v. DiLoreto, 888 F.2d 
996, 999 (3d Cir. 1989), overruled on other grounds, United States v. 
Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252 (3d Cir. 1995) (en banc); United States v. Dispoz- 
O-Plastics, Inc., 172 F.3d 275, 284 (3d Cir. 1999), are distinguishable; 
in 
both cases, the prosecutor's statements were considered improper 
vouching because they referred to evidence outside the trial record. 
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See Walker, 155 F.3d at 187 (citing United States v. 
Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1125 (3d Cir. 1990)). 
 
Appellants argue that the prosecutor's comments and the 
related evidence at trial implied that the "government had 
some extra-record knowledge and capacity to monitor the 
truthfulness of the cooperating witnesses." The prosecutor, 
however, never suggested that the government's evaluation 
of the witnesses' testimony would be based on anything 
other than the testimony at trial. The District Court did not 
commit any error, much less plain error, in allowing the 
prosecutor's comments as to Rishty's and Beyda's 
credibility during rebuttal argument. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Because we find the District Court's error in admitting 
extrinsic evidence of a hearsay declarant's prior bad acts to 
be harmless, because we conclude that the District Court 
did not err or abuse its discretion in its other challenged 
rulings, and because the prosecutor's closing argument 
presented no error, we will affirm the convictions. 
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